JR Kyushu near collision on Nagasaki Main Line

[bikkuri bahn]

Train stopped just 93m from the other train.

https://youtube.com/watch?v=_CGRKMsyakc

 

*will post more later, gotta turn in as its late

[miyakoji]

How'd that happen? Well, 93m is better than <= 0m.

[katoftw]

Interesting considering which platform the 885 is on?  Looks to be heading away from the 787.  Or at least travelling in the same direction.  The 787 has probably used emergency brakes a semi derailed over the crossing and turnout.

 

So either the 885 was stopped/broken down and the 787 come racing up behind it.  Or the 885 somehow was routed to the wrong platform.

Edited May 22, 2015 by katoftw

[kvp]

Katoftw, i think you might wanted to write track, instead of platform. Afaik it could be anything from a misrouting to a cut switch or the slower train just getting caught up by the faster one behind it. It would also be interesting to know what or who stopped them, the automation or the drivers?

[JR 500系]

Interesting considering which platform the 885 is on?  Looks to be heading away from the 787.  Or at least travelling in the same direction.  The 787 has probably used emergency brakes a semi derailed over the crossing and turnout.

 

So either the 885 was stopped/broken down and the 787 come racing up behind it.  Or the 885 somehow was routed to the wrong platform.

 

Negative. According to news, It is travelling at opposite directions and was heading towards each other. It involved Kamome 20 Nagasaki to Hakata and Kamome 19 Hakata to Nagasaki. Something happened and the track directed them to be on the same track. Very lucky the quick response of both drivers managed to apply emergency brakes to save the situation. 93cm was dangerous, but it could have been worse. Both drivers deserve a medal for prompt response saving lives!

 

Here's more news on this, and the video which was removed by youtube can be viewed here: http://headlines.yahoo.co.jp/videonews/jnn?a=20150522-00000067-jnn-soci

 

Amazing how the signalling failed and got 2 high speed limited express trains running on the same track.

[miyakoji]

93cm was dangerous, but it could have been worse

 

like 93mm!  :).... :(  sorry

[JR 500系]

like 93mm!  :).... :(  sorry

 

Apologizes! It should have been 93m ... Typo.. 93 cm is like less than 1m, they would have been kissing each other! 93mm would be coupled together!  :)

[Guest keio6000]

video removed?

[katoftw]

just click JR500s link.  there is about 6 different videos to what on the subject.

[JR 500系]

Couldn't get this correct on goggle translator:

 

ＪＲによりますと、トラブルの直前、下り列車の位置をめぐって運転士と指令員との間で食い違いが生じ、指令員はポイントを切り替える前に発車の指示をしたということです。

 

Came out on goggle translator like this:

 

When depends on the JR, just before the trouble, discrepancy occurs between the dispatcher and the motorman On position of down train, dispatcher is that it was an indication of a departure before switching point.

 

Did someone beat a red signal light?

 

[railsquid]

There was a misunderstanding between the driver and the control centre about the position of the down train, the control centre told the train to move on before the point was changed.

 

(From the news report I saw, the section was under manual control due to preceding delays; no singal failure per-se).

[E6系]

Hello,

 

Congratulations to JR Kyushu drivers for avoiding a serious accident.  The driver of 787系 applied the brake contacted operations centre as soon as his service moved to the wrong track.  I am not sure if operations centre advised the 885系 or if the driver spotted the danger.  Either way, the accident was averted, thanks to excellent training, point-and-say, no driver reading book or newspaper, no driver using mobile phone and no driver listening to radio or music whilst at his post.

[cteno4]

Layers of safety and training, it works!

 

Jeff

[bikkuri bahn]

This diagram shows what happened, which is more understandable than written explanations:

 

 

The driver reported his position incorrectly after the first emergency stop (which was instituted to check on an unusual sound), the control center thought the train (Kamome #19) was 160m before the signal governing the passing loop, when in fact it was alongside it.  The control center directed Kamome #19 to proceed forward to the signal (and stop if necessary), and wait for the point to change.  The driver proceeded before the point could change.

Edited May 24, 2015 by bikkuri bahn

[kvp]

This is another example where positive train control could help avoid a collision without putting all hope on the shoulders of the drivers. In this case, the drivers were good enough to spot the danger and reacted correctly, but hoping that this will always be the case is imho not a really good long term strategy.

[miyakoji]

So it'll be the engineer on Kamome 19 writing essays and picking weeds for a month?

[Sacto1985]

This is another example where positive train control could help avoid a collision without putting all hope on the shoulders of the drivers. In this case, the drivers were good enough to spot the danger and reacted correctly, but hoping that this will always be the case is imho not a really good long term strategy.

 

Isn't JR East testing a form of Positive Train Control in northern Japan? Given the enormous potential safety benefits of PTC, they could have real-time monitoring of every train on the tracks and avoid situations like this.

 

(EDIT: I believe what I'm talking about could be something like the ATACS system that JR East is testing in the Sendai area. a modified version of ATACS could tell the driver the exact track position.)

Edited May 24, 2015 by Sacto1985

[kvp]

Actually PTC in the form of the ATS system was implemented on all imporant routes by the JNR somewhere around the time the high cab 103 series arrived. Automatic train control and rollings blocks are not required for stopping a train that tries to go past a red signal and rollings blocks are not even required for automatic operation, since that can be done with the block based ATC. Actually any continous system that enforces the speed limit regardless of checkpoints (signals) on the entire block is good. The first one i know of was the one installed by Siemens and Halske in 1896 on the newly built budapest underground railway. It used (an still uses) inductive train position detection and traction power cutoff based ATS. The idea was that the distributed electromechanical ATC system never allows two trains to come nearer as one block (upgraded to 2 microblocks in 1973). So it's not rocket science and as the ATS rollout in Japan in the 1960-ies proved, it's doable on a large scale.

 

ps: i still wonder why was this line running on manual control...

[EF65 1100]

Actually PTC in the form of the ATS system was implemented on all imporant routes by the JNR somewhere around the time the high cab 103 series arrived. Automatic train control and rollings blocks are not required for stopping a train that tries to go past a red signal and rollings blocks are not even required for automatic operation, since that can be done with the block based ATC. Actually any continous system that enforces the speed limit regardless of checkpoints (signals) on the entire block is good. The first one i know of was the one installed by Siemens and Halske in 1896 on the newly built budapest underground railway. It used (an still uses) inductive train position detection and traction power cutoff based ATS. The idea was that the distributed electromechanical ATC system never allows two trains to come nearer as one block (upgraded to 2 microblocks in 1973). So it's not rocket science and as the ATS rollout in Japan in the 1960-ies proved, it's doable on a large scale.

 

ps: i still wonder why was this line running on manual control...

This blog post seems to explain the events a little better -

http://que-sais-je.hatenablog.com/entry/2015/05/23/JR長崎本線のあわや正面衝突はなぜ起きたか

 

Kamome #19 and #20 were supposed to pass each other at Hizen Kashima.

Apparently, Kamome #19 stopped just passed the home signal at the Hizen Ryuo station after the driver hears some strange noise. There was a miscommunication between the controller and the driver of Kamome #19 as to where the train was. To avoid delays, the passing station was changed to Hizen Ryuo, changing the portion of the route to manual control. Kamome #20 was then cleared to travel to Hizen Ryuo station's siding.

[Davo Dentetsu]

So it'll be the engineer on Kamome 19 writing essays and picking weeds for a month?

Bit harsh if they did, had there been damage or... worse, absolutely investigate.  But otherwise, the job was done flawlessly on the ground.

[miyakoji]

After Amagasaki, there was some reporting on the use of so-called nikkin kyoiku amongst the JR companies.  As I recall, it's administered for all sorts of infractions, minor and major.  If the driver on Kamome 19 reported his position incorrectly, I assume he'll take the hit.

[JR 500系]

Nikkin Kyioku, this phase seems to come up recently so often. There was a TV show last night on channel news asia at 8pm called 'Brakeless'. It featured the Amagasaki train crash, but in a different prospective. It tackles issues with JR West management about staff especially Nikkin Kyioku, and how the staff were so stressed it made them afraid to drive trains. There were even reports whereby staff members from JR West were deployed to spy on station crew hidden on bridges or acting as commuters to ensure the staff do their work perfectly.

 

I tried to goggle it to try and download it, but I couldn't find it. The show was interesting in the fact of shedding light on how JR staff employees were treated, but on the other hand how so many people longed to be an employee of JR West when they were young.

 

Anyone has any idea how to download a previously aired program on channe news asia? This show will be nice to keep.

[JR 500系]

Ah I finally found the video I was talking about on youtube:

 

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a_SgPxwi6R0

 

So it initially came as a BBC documentary...

[bikkuri bahn]

I think if there is any blame to give, it's not only the driver, who otherwise acted by the rules, but the CTC center, for failing to reconfirm train position.

[kvp]

I see three possible cases:

a ) the driver intentionally misreported his position, since running a red signal is a bigger problem and in turn he received the wrong proceed order: in this case the fault is on the driver

b ) the center heard the right position, but gave the wrong proceed order: in this case the fault is on the center

c ) the center didn't understand the position and failed to confim it and the driver failed to recognise the wrong proceed order: in this case the fault is on both of them, a typicial case of miscommunication and failing to check information and orders

 

I'm sure the investigation can uncover what was said by whom.